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COMMENT 
CRUISES, CLASS ACTIONS, AND THE COURT 
David Korn and David Rosenberg* 
As the Carnival Triumph debacle splashed across the national 
consciousness,1 lawyers shook their heads. Sensationalist news 
coverage exposed common knowledge in the legal community: 
cruise passengers have little recourse against carriers, and, as a result, 
they often bear the brunt of serious physical and financial injuries. 
Cruise lines, escaping legal accountability for their negligence, sail 
off undeterred from neglecting passenger safety on future voyages.2 
While its previous decisions helped entrench this problem, a recently 
argued case presents the Supreme Court with another opportunity to 
address it.3 
The fine print on cruise ship tickets requires that passengers 
submit most claims to arbitration and prohibits passengers from 
uniting similar claims in a class action or class arbitration.4 It 
might not be apparent why a passenger with a claim worth 
thousands of dollars would lack recourse without class action, but 
the process of resolving claims individually is biased in favor of 
the cruise line, and only class action allows evenhanded 
* David Korn is a 2013 J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School, where David
Rosenberg is the Lee S. Kreindler Professor of Law. They are the authors of David 
Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcions’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: 
The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming June 2013). This 
Comment applies arguments from that paper to recent developments in the cruise industry 
and before the Supreme Court. 
1. See, e.g., Curt Anderson, Cruise Lawsuits Are in, but Carnival Has Advantage, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Feb. 21, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/crui 
se-lawsuits-are-carnival-has-advantage. 
2. See generally Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passenger’s Dilemma: Twenty-
First Century Ships, Nineteenth-Century Rights, 28 TUL. MAR. L.J. 447 (2004). 
3. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12–133 (argued Feb. 27, 2013).
4. See Ticket Contract, CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, http://www.carnival.com/CMS/Static_
Templates/ticket_contract.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). 
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justice.5 The bias arises because, in any individual case involving 
questions common to a group of plaintiffs, the cruise line will 
greatly outspend any individual claimant, not just because of its 
greater wealth, but because it has a greater stake in the litigation 
classwide.6 
Suppose the 4000 Triumph passengers each suffered $1000 in 
damages, which they believe was caused by the cruise line’s 
negligence. Proceeding separately, each passenger would spend 
no more than $1000 to prove the defendant’s negligence, but the 
defendant, concerned about its total liability, would spend up to 
$400,000. The parties will get what they pay for, and the 
defendant’s first-class defense likely will prevail over each 
passenger’s cut-rate case. Realizing their disadvantage, rational 
plaintiffs may decide not to file otherwise worthy individual 
claims. 
Class action eliminates this disparity in economic power. By 
aggregating all claims, plaintiffs gain the same incentive to make 
a first-class case that the defendant naturally possesses. This does 
not apply just for cruises, because class action evens the playing 
field for a broad spectrum of claims that affect our lives: 
employment discrimination, environmental harm, securities and 
consumer fraud, anti-competitive conduct, constitutional 
violations, and mass torts.7  
The fate of the Carnival Triumph passengers may have been 
sealed by a Supreme Court ruling from 2011. In AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion,8 the Court upheld clauses in arbitration agreements 
that banned class procedures despite state law findings that such 
contracts were unconscionable. 9 While Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion questioned the cost and formality of class arbitration,10 
none of the justices addressed the pro-defendant bias that exists 
without a class solution. 
5. See David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcions’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the
Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 
June 2013). 
6. See id. 
7. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
(forthcoming June 2013). 
8. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
9. See id. at 1744, 1748.
10. See id. at 1751–52.
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 The Court has a chance to change course when it 
decides American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,11 a case 
that concerns millions of claims brought by small retailers who 
allege that the credit card company violated the Sherman 
Antitrust Act by abusing monopoly power.12 Below, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce an arbitration 
agreement that barred class actions because high costs would 
render any individual plaintiff’s claim economically 
impractical.13 An essential expert analysis would cost at least 
$300,000, but even the highest-volume retailer would only expect 
to recover damages of $12,850.14 To avoid this hopeless situation, 
the plaintiffs ask the Supreme Court to refuse to require 
individual arbitration that does not allow the effective vindication 
of legal rights.15  
The danger is that the Court may go only halfway, striking 
down some aspects of the American Express agreement without 
requiring a form of class action. Half-measures, such as allowing 
plaintiffs to voluntarily join their claims or requiring that a 
defendant pay the fees and costs of a prevailing plaintiff, leave in 
place pro-defendant bias. Voluntary joinder of millions of claims 
is an impractical substitute for class action aggregation, and 
shifting a plaintiff’s fees and costs does not change the parties’ 
disproportionate stakes. Even if American Express footed the 
$300,000 bill for the plaintiffs’ expert analysis, it could still 
overwhelm a minimally competent case by spending many 
millions more on its own analysis. 
Instead, the Court should embrace a more robust “effective 
vindication” rule, allowing states to limit the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements that compromise claimants’ substantive 
rights. American Express allows the Supreme Court to finally 
acknowledge a bias that endangers the enforcement of laws upon 
which we depend. 
11. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted by Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (argued Feb. 27, 
2013). 
12. See id. at 207–08.
13. See id. at 218.
14. Id. at 217–18.
15. Brief for Respondents at 46–47, Am, Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12–133
(U.S. Jan. 22, 2013), 2013 WL 267025. 
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If the Court does not address this bias, it may be up to 
Congress to legislate class methods that allow the effective 
enforcement of its laws. Ideally, Congress would amend the 
Federal Arbitration Act16 to limit the effects of the Supreme 
Court’s class arbitration rulings. But Congress could start with 
smaller steps, requiring the availability of class procedures for 
rights protected in new legislation. Amid continuing Carnival 
incidents, New York Senator Chuck Schumer proposed a 
“passenger’s bill of rights” that would expand substantive 
protections for cruise consumers that would strengthen medical 
care and refund requirements.17 Though perhaps a less telegenic 
proposal, Congress should supplement any cruise reforms by 
specifically permitting either class action or class arbitration 
options for those bringing passenger claims. Until the Court or 
Congress addresses this overlooked pro-defendant bias, cruise 
carriers, credit card companies, and many others who inflict 
classwide injuries will avoid full responsibility for their actions. 
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
17. Press Release, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Calls for Cruise Ship
“Bill of Rights” (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=34 
1068. 
